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This article reviews the origins, development and impact of the European Employment
Strategy against the backdrop of the employment performances and policies of the
EU, from the early 1990s up to the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005. It
recalls how the issue of employment was put at the centre of the policy debate in the
1990s and of the discussion about the right balance between economic and social policy
integration at EU level. While the EU-wide emphasis on employment initiated in the
mid-1990s is likely to have had some positive effects, in particular in terms of a return
to employment growth and an increase in participation and employment rates, many
major challenges remain or have developed in the meantime. The experience of the
EES shows that there is room for a European strategy to promote growth and jobs.
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Introduction
As so often in the development of the European
Union, and this is the case for employment and so-
cial policies, progress in integration is associated
with the names of cities. In June 1997, the signing of
the Amsterdam Treaty gave new tasks to the Union
in the field of social policies and introduced the Em-
ployment Title Ð a new section in the Treaty dealing
with the coordination of employment policies. In
November of the same year, the Luxembourg EU
Employment Summit launched the European Em-
ployment Strategy (EES), a new form of employ-
ment policy coordination, and in 2000, the Lisbon
Summit launched an agenda of economic reforms
asking the EU to create conditions for a return to
full employment and to strengthen social cohesion.1
Lisbon and subsequent European Councils put for-
ward ambitious objectives and targets on employ-
ment, quality in work and the fight against poverty,
and supplemented the more traditional Community
methods with the open method of coordination as a
policy methodology to pursue these goals.
This article reviews the origins, development and
impact of the EES against the backdrop of the em-
ployment performance and policies of the EU. It re-
calls the political steps that led to the emergence
of the Strategy in the mid-1990s and discusses its
adaptation over time in the light of major economic
and policy developments, in particular the impact of
enlargement. It reflects on its future in the context
of the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy for growth
and jobs in 2005.
Notwithstanding the importance of policy develop-
ments since 1997, it would be wrong to believe that
the policy process on employment started with the
adoption of the Amsterdam Employment Title. The
principal policy issues of how to promote monetary
stability, economic growth and high levels of em-
ployment in a coherent manner and how to balance
economic and social objectives have accompanied
the Community from its early days and are reflected
in the Maastricht Treaty and in particular in the
“White Paper on Economic Growth, Competitive-
ness and Employment” adopted by the Commission
in 1993.
The draft Constitutional Treaty has largely con-
firmed these new policy elements and strengthened
1 The strategic goal set in Lisbon by EU leaders for the next
decade is summarised as follows: “to become the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion”.
124 ZAF 1/2006
some aspects by integrating policy coordination in
the economic, employment and social areas in one
provision, namely Article 14, and by highlighting
full employment as one of the key objectives of the
Union.
Indeed, the period since the adoption of the Am-
sterdam Treaty has shown progress in actual labour
market performance. By 2001, unemployment had
come down from over 10% to 7.7% since Amster-
dam and the employment rate had increased from
around 60% to over 64%. These improvements in
overall labour market performance have come to a
halt in subsequent years, in a context of sluggish eco-
nomic growth. Unemployment reached a new peak
of 9.0% at the end of 2004. Prospects for 2006Ð2007
may look brighter as economic growth is expected
to pick up.
Against this background, both the review of the Em-
ployment Strategy in 2002 and the report of Wim
Kok’s Employment Task Force in 2003 have high-
lighted the role and significance of the European
Employment Strategy. In particular, they have em-
phasised the need to move from words and commit-
ments to action on policy implementation, and to
tackle areas where policy conflict is likely to emerge.
The relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 is meant
to strengthen the momentum and consistency of ac-
tion at national and EU level.
1 The issue of employment
in the early 1990s
The early and mid-1990s saw a rather dismal labour
market performance in the EU as a whole and in
most Member States. Unemployment rates were
consistently over 10%, youth unemployment
around 20%, and 5% of the active population was
out of work for more than 12 months. Despite a re-
turn to economic growth, employment rates stag-
nated at the 60% level, well below the figures meas-
ured in the 1970s and even further below those re-
corded in the US and Japan. By 1996, only three
Member States were showing any improvements in
performance, the Netherlands, Ireland and Den-
mark. This raised serious questions about the ability
of European societies to provide jobs for all citizens
and provided ammunition to those who spoke of the
“European disease”. Others presented persistent
high unemployment as reflecting the concentration
of policy efforts to achieve EMU leaving little room
for policies to combat unemployment. Although
from very different perspectives, both strands ofGeorg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU
thinking question the balance between the economic
and the social dimensions of European integration
in the post-Maastricht Union.
The President of the Commission at the time, Jac-
ques Delors, felt that following the introduction of
the single market and the agreement on EMU, ac-
tion on employment was at the top of the agenda.
In 1993, the Commission submitted its “White Paper
on Economic Growth, Competitiveness and Em-
ployment” to the European Council. The document
outlines a strategy comprising research and develop-
ment, tax policies, industrial policy, education and
labour market measures as well as direct action at
EU level to finance major investment in transport
and research. Much of the substance of EU policies
that were agreed later can be traced back to pro-
posals contained in this White Paper.
Jacques Delors insisted that responsibility for em-
ployment policies should lie with the Prime Minis-
ters and that the traditional division of Finance Min-
isters being responsible for the economy and La-
bour Ministers being responsible for the unem-
ployed was part of the problem. Hence the practice
was established that Prime Ministers would monitor
progress in the meetings of the European Council.
As a response to the White Paper, the Essen Euro-
pean Council agreed in December 1994 on five key
objectives to be pursued by the Member States.
Box: Why European action on employment? have strong incentives for acting at EU level.
Moreover, supporters of a social Europe have
From the mid-1990s onwards, European docu- traditionally fewer resources than their oppo-
ments started to mention a common European nents, partly because they are relative newcom-
concern for employment, justifying the need for ers in the EU arena compared with economic
European action, as was later reflected in the Am- actors, and partly because they have more diffi-
sterdam Employment Title and in the develop- culty joining forces and acting consistently at
ment of the “Luxembourg Process”. This contrasts EU level. Almost everybody seems to be deter-
with previous positions of many policy-makers in mined by the wish to preserve national sover-
the EU, who did not see any role for the Union eignty.
in the area of employment. Many policy analysts
Ð practical and technical constraints: the wide di- would have argued that four types of constraints
versity of economic performances and priori- would prevent the EU from being active in em-
ties across the EU and the great heterogeneity ployment issues:
of social and labour market institutions make
Ð legal and institutional constraints: the principle any form of harmonisation hardly likely, if not
of subsidiarity and the intergovernmental bias unrealistic, in practice.
on employment matters Ð with few competen-
Ð financial constraints: the lack of major financial ces attributed to the EU and the requirement
resources beyond the European Social Fund of consensus Ð imply that no action is the most
for economic policy management of the EU did likely option, as agreement is only possible on
not permit the provision of major resources to the basis of the lowest common denominator;
parts of the Community with serious employ-
Ð political and ideological constraints: given the ment problems (comparable to a system of fis-
lack of competences, national actors do not cal federalism) and led it to develop regulatory
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These included the development of human resour-
ces, the promotion of investments through moderate
wages policies, the improvement of the efficiency of
labour market institutions, the identification of new
sources of jobs through local initiatives, and the pro-
motion of access to the world of work for young
people, long-term unemployed people and women.
The Essen European Council also called upon
Member States to prepare multi-annual pro-
grammes reflecting the policy recommendations and
asked the ECOFIN and Labour and Social Affairs
Councils to monitor progress. The first “joint” re-
port on employment was prepared by the two Coun-
cils and the Commission and was presented to the
European Council in Madrid in 1995.
In response, the Madrid European Council stated:
“For the Union and the Member States the fight
against unemployment is the priority task”. It also
prepared the ground for the crucial institutional pro-
vision of the Employment Title: “Promoting em-
ployment makes national economic and structural
policies a matter of common concern. Therefore ...
the IGC should examine how the Union could pro-
vide the basis for a better cooperation and coordina-
tion in order to strengthen national policies.” Conse-
quently, this led, at the end of 1996, to the establish-
ment of a permanent Employment and Labour
Market Committee composed of government repre-
sentatives and the Commission.The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat
(“hard-law”) and policy coordination (“soft- ... underlying economic, social and political factors
law”) instruments instead.
The political circumstances of 1997 do not give the
full picture. As was shown above, the foundations
of the EU action on employment had already A market-making EU social policy?
been partly laid in the early 1990s. The role of the
EU had already been addressed in the intergov- Given these constraints, it is actually quite re-
ernmental conference of 1996 leading to the Am- markable that the EU engaged in action in the
sterdam Treaty. Several underlying political, eco- field of employment. For some authors, the Euro-
nomic and social factors may account for these de- pean social policy emerged and gradually devel-
velopments, in the context of increasing political oped as a corollary or as a complement to the pre-
and economic integration throughout Europe. vailing process of economic integration, with spill-
over effects possibly leading to unanticipated
Ð Economic governance in the context of EMU breakthroughs, for instance as a result of rulings
and the impact on employment: Throughout the from the European Court of Justice [Leibfried/
1990s, there was a debate about the inclusion Pierson 1995]. Others analyse the emergence of
of an employment dimension in the Maastricht the European social policy as a process of “nega-
criteria for EMU participation. Many Ð well tive” integration within the Union [Majone 1998],
beyond the trade unions and the traditional whereby EU legislation is meant to dismantle ob-
left Ð felt that the Maastricht process with its stacles to economic efficiency, without any social
emphasis on nominal convergence and finan- goals being pursued on their own.
cial stability would damage economic and in
particular employment growth. The question European action in the social field was therefore
raised was whether a “rigorous” preparation of long described as a market-making or market-
EMU would not leave employment and espe- building social policy. Hence, for instance, the fo-
cially the unemployed behind. And indeed, cus on the free movement of workers, on regulat-
with the exception of a few countries, unem- ing health and safety conditions through EU di-
ployment remained stubbornly high and em- rectives and on investment in human resources
ployment growth was weak despite economic through the European Social Fund so as to ensure
recovery and some progress towards the Maas- a sound functioning of the single market and a
tricht criteria. While none of the European ac- more adaptable workforce. Such explanations
tors at the time proposed an additional Maas- may hold for describing the state-of-play prior to
tricht criterion dealing with unemployment, the the Amsterdam Treaty.
bleak employment performance created a po-
litical demand for a strong European commit-
ment to employment. EU activism on employment Ð political change in
major countries and ...
Ð Mutual dependency of labour markets in the EU
(creating win-win environments, avoiding social The definition and launch of the EES result from
dumping). There are deeper economic and so- the combination of political circumstances and un-
cial factors in place which may justify EU ac- derlying dynamics. To a large extent, 1997 pro-
tion on employment. First, with the growth of vided a window of opportunity for political activ-
the single market and more so with EMU on ism to materialise, with newly elected govern-
the horizon, it would have been wrong to be- ments willing to raise the employment agenda to
lieve that even the biggest Member States EU level. Early in 1997, the French electoral cam-
could pursue employment policies totally inde- paign had been influenced by the “Vilvorde case”,
pendently of developments in other countries. the sudden closure of a Renault plant near Brus-
Trade creates such dependency as well as mi- sels, which led to the first “Euro-demonstrations”.
gration (although actual intra-EU mobility is Having threatened not to sign the Stability Pact
limited). There is also a socio-psychological/po- during the campaign, the newly elected French
litical economy dependency: the impact of high government made its approval conditional on
unemployment in some Member States on the stronger EU action on employment. The Jobs
economic and social climate in the Union as a Summit of November 1997 was a response to this
whole. Even an economy with low unemploy- call. At the same time, the change of government
ment and high employment will be deeply af- in the United Kingdom and the willingness to pro-
fected by the confidence effects of high unem- mote New Labour’s “Third Way” led to renewed
ployment elsewhere if the countries are big British activism at EU level, after years of dead-
and/or deeply integrated in the EU economy. lock.
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A specific concern is that such dependency may practice exchange. This approach was based on
create a race to the bottom in terms of working the realisation that major aspects of EU em-
conditions and wages and a race to the top in ployment problems were not or not exclusively
terms of subsidising activity. Actual evidence the result of macroeconomic management but
was anecdotal but as EMU came closer, such of structural features to be addressed nation-
concerns became more pronounced Ð as was ally as part of an EU-wide policy effort.
strongly expressed by the European Social
Democrats at the time. Ð Putting flesh on the concept of European citi-
zenship: Since the Maastricht Treaty, the con-
Ð Learning from each other to implement struc- cept of European citizenship has gained signifi-
tural reforms (same problems, same solutions?): cance and features prominently in the Charter
Against this background, European policy of Fundamental Rights of the Constitutional
makers felt that some commonality in the ap- Treaty. Activities in the field of social protec-
proach to employment and unemployment tion, social inclusion and the fight against dis-
would help to improve the state of affairs. The crimination, which have much to do with em-
idea was to use the EU level to promote em- ployment, have developed since the Amster-
ployment policies at national level, be it to ar- dam Treaty came into force, with implications
gue with the national Finance Minister or with in terms of EU legislation and policy coordina-
the social partners Ð all of whom were critical tion. The application of the Charter of Funda-
about action on employment, although for dif- mental Rights may lead to further synergies be-
ferent reasons. Hence the two elements of EU tween EU legislation and policy coordination
policy coordination: peer pressure and best in future.
2 The Employment Title of the
Amsterdam Treaty and the
Luxembourg Process
2.1 The Amsterdam Treaty and the new
Title on Employment
The introduction of a new legal basis in the Amster-
dam Treaty allowed a new political will to material-
ise. As the political agreement on the Treaty coin-
cided with the signing of the Stability and Growth
Pact in June 1997, intense discussions arose on the
need to ensure that growth and employment would
figure as prominent goals of the new European
framework (see box). Heads of State and Govern-
ment decided to hold their first Jobs Summit in
Luxembourg City in November 1997 and decided
to launch the European Employment Strategy
(EES) Ð also known as the Luxembourg Process Ð
in anticipation of the Treaty coming into force.
While the Treaty does not change the principle of
the Member States being responsible for employ-
ment policy, it entrusts the European institutions,
notably the Council and the Commission, with a
stronger role, new tasks and more forceful tools.
Moreover, the European Parliament has a role in
the decision-making process. The Amsterdam
Treaty also enhances the role of the European social
partners through the inclusion of the Social Protocol
into the Treaty. The Title on Employment Policy
contains the following elements:
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1. The importance of the employment objective is
enhanced by the fact that the employment arti-
cles are included in the Treaty as a title and not
as a chapter (comparable to the title on economic
policy).
2. It emphasises that employment is an issue of
“common concern”. The Member States are to
co-ordinate their employment policies at Com-
munity level.
3. The Member States and the Community are
asked to work towards developing a co-ordinated
strategy for employment and particularly for pro-
moting a skilled, trained and adaptable work-
force and labour markets responsive to economic
change.
4. Article 127 also contains the principle of “main-
streaming” employment policy: all Community
policies should take the employment objective
into account.
5. It creates the framework for a country surveil-
lance procedure (Article 128): Member States’
employment policies are examined by means of
a yearly Joint Employment Report established by
the Commission and the Council. Furthermore,
the Commission proposes and the Council adopts
yearly Employment Guidelines for the Member
States, which Member States should take into ac-
count when drawing up their National Action
Plans for Employment. Finally the Commission
may propose and the Council adopt recommen-
dations for individual Member States.
6. It establishes a permanent, institutional structure
(Article 130), the Employment Committee, to ad-The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat
vise the Council and the Commission on employ-
ment issues and thereby to enable an improved
preparation of Council deliberations.
7. It creates a legal basis for analysis, research, ex-
change of best practice and the promotion of in-
centive measures for employment (Article 129).
8. Finally, it makes it possible for decisions to be
taken by qualified majority, which prevents a sin-
gle country from blocking decisions or recom-
mendations.
2.2 Luxembourg agreement: the launch
of the European Employment
Strategy
When the Luxembourg Jobs Summit (November
1997) launched the EES on the basis of the new pro-
visions of the Amsterdam Treaty, the ambition was
to achieve decisive progress within five years. Heads
of State and Government agreed on a framework
for action based on the commitment from Member
States to establish a set of common objectives and
targets for employment policy. This co-ordination of
employment policies at EU level was to follow the
principles foreseen in the (draft) Treaty:
 Employment Guidelines set out priorities for
Member States’ employment policies.
 Country-specific Employment Recommendations
 National Action Plans: every Member State is to
draw up an annual National Action Plan which
takes account of Guidelines and Recommenda-
tions.
 Joint Employment Report: the Commission and
the Council are to examine jointly each National
Action Plan and present a Joint Employment Re-
port as a basis for revised Employment Guidelines
and Recommendations for individual countries.
In this way, the EES started to deliver a rolling pro-
gramme of yearly planning, monitoring, examina-
tion and re-adjustment of national employment poli-
cies. The EES also initiated a new working method
at EU level, which was to become known as the
open method of co-ordination (OMC) following the
conclusions of the Lisbon European Council in
2000. Management by objectives (including through
targets), country surveillance (“peer pressure”) and
mutual learning are central features of the EES. Fol-
lowing the Lisbon Council, the OMC was to be rep-
licated in other areas, such as social inclusion and
pensions.
The Luxembourg Council adopted the first set of
employment guidelines centred on four areas of pol-
icy action (“pillars”):
“Improving employability”, the first pillar, was
aimed at reintegrating into the labour market the
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large number of people who have been out of work
for a long period. Enhancing the job-related skills
and job-search capacities of the unemployed should
allow them to return to employment rapidly. Two
reorientations in policy terms were advocated. First,
the focus on the administration of unemployment
benefits, should be replaced by a focus on getting
the unemployed back into employment (“activa-
tion”). Secondly, action should be initiated as early
as possible when somebody becomes unemployed
rather than holding back policy instruments for
those already unemployed for a long time (“preven-
tion”). Early action is based on the view that the
traditional approach of concentrating measures on
the long-term unemployed had actually exacerbated
the phenomenon it had wished to address.
Removing obstacles to job creation was the purpose
of the second pillar, “developing entrepreneurship”.
The policy measures advocated under this heading
included the simplification of rules for setting up en-
terprises and for employing people, as well as reduc-
tions in the tax burden on labour, and were aimed
at mobilising businesses for creating jobs.
Helping workers in jobs to adapt to structural
change, thereby preventing unemployment from oc-
curring, was the idea of the third pillar, “encourag-
ing adaptability”. The social partners were seen as
the main addressees of this pillar. Lifelong learning
by means of the joint action of the social partners
and the public authorities became one of the poli-
cies advocated under this pillar.
“Strengthening equal opportunities between women
and men” was presented as the fourth pillar and was
designed to signal to women that they were no
longer seen as the “biggest” problem group and that
equal opportunities should become an important
driver for making European labour markets more
efficient. Two policies were developed under this
pillar. First, workers with responsibilities for caring
for family members, the vast majority of whom are
women, should receive the support necessary for full
participation in employment. Secondly, the “main-
streaming of equal opportunities” in all areas of em-
ployment policies should be ensured, meaning that
the specific situation of women and men should be
taken into account when designing and implement-
ing employment policies and labour market pro-
grammes.
The creators of the strategy were well aware that
job creation is at the heart of the EU employment
challenge: “The objective of these measures, which
are to form part of the overall strategy for employ-
ment, is to arrive at a significant increase in the em-Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU
ployment rate on a lasting base” (Presidency Conclu-
sions Luxembourg 1997, paragraph 22). However,
they did not endorse the target of a 70% employ-
ment rate as proposed by the Commission.2 Only
some years later, following further political change
and against the backdrop of a favourable employ-
ment trend, did the Lisbon and Stockholm Euro-
pean Councils put forward the employment rate tar-
gets: the EU should achieve an employment rate of
70% by 2010, with at least 60% for women and
50% for workers aged 55Ð64.
The first set of guidelines nevertheless developed
the idea of quantitative targets as part of the specific
methodology described above. Prime Minister Jun-
cker, the chair of the Luxembourg European Coun-
cil, attached quantitative targets as a basis for
benchmarking. Such targets were seen to have mul-
tiple functions. The feeling was and still is that quan-
titative targets can raise policy ambition as they,
firstly, make policy progress measurable and, sec-
ondly, make results comparable. Moreover, by de-
fining common quantitative targets, the pressure to-
wards the convergence of outcomes should increase.
The development of quantitative targets and of
comparable EU-wide indicators based on harmo-
nised statistics became a major preoccupation of the
employment coordination process.3 The annual joint
report on employment contains an annex reporting
on indicators, including agreed quantitative targets.
The most important quantitative targets at the time
related to activation and prevention, requiring that
all unemployed people should be offered an alterna-
tive to unemployment before being unemployed for
12 months (before reaching 6 months of unemploy-
ment for young people), and to the training of the
unemployed. Later on, new targets were added, in-
ter alia, on the proportion of the adult population
participating in lifelong learning activities and on
the availability of childcare.
3 Improvement in employment per-
formance since the mid-1990s:
a mere coincidence?
In the period between 1997 and 2002, the EU expe-
rienced a relatively strong increase in employment
2 The detailed assessment of the Luxembourg strategy by the Eu-
ropean Trade Union Confederation highlighted this refusal as a
weakness (ETUC Memo on the 1998 Employment Guidelines,
9.12.1997).
3 Following the Lisbon Council, structural indicators were devel-
oped (cf. Eurostat website) to reflect the Lisbon objectives includ-
ing those on employment. The latter were also integrated into the
EES.
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and employment rates. This was accompanied by a
drop in unemployment and an even more pro-
nounced one in long-term unemployment. Consider-
ing that economic growth in the period was weaker
than in the upswing of the late 1980s while the reac-
tion of labour market indicators was stronger, a
structural change in the labour market may have
taken place. Several studies by the IMF and the
OECD were published which highlighted that some-
thing had changed in EU labour markets. The Com-
mission analysed these changes in the annual Em-
ployment in Europe reports and in its annual report
on the EU economy. The following points were
made.
Better functioning of EU labour markets:
Econometric estimates showed a drop in the
NAIRU (as a proxy for structural unemployment)
starting in the mid-1990s. It was quite pronounced,
and accelerated in the 2000Ð2003 period. Of course,
the drop in the NAIRU followed the overall unem-
ployment trends but this situation is in contrast to
the late 1980s, when unemployment in the EU also
fell but the NAIRU estimates did not decrease. The
drop in the NAIRU was accompanied by an in-
crease in employment and in participation rates sug-
gesting that Europe was capable of benefiting from
employment increases to absorb existing unemploy-
ment and to attract additional labour supply.
Increased job content of growth and higher
participation leading to a drop in unemploy-
ment:
A comparison of the labour market behaviour in the
1980s and the 1990s4 shows that in the later period,
the response of unemployment was more pro-
nounced when resources were underutilised (meas-
ured by the output gap), while this was not the case
in the 1980s, indicating that the absorption of unem-
ployment was weak in the 1980s. The analysis also
shows that employment generally responded more
strongly to economic growth in the second period
and that this was made possible by a stronger in-
crease in participation in periods when the economy
was above its potential. This relates especially to the
continued increase in female participation and also
in a rising share of migrant workers in employment.5
These structural changes can not be explained by
compositional effects alone Ð neither demographic
changes nor the secular increase in educational lev-
4 See for instance, European Commission: Employment in Eu-
rope 2002 (chapter 2).
5 European Commission: Employment in Europe 2004.The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat
els provide major explanatory factors for the in-
crease in employment rates. While the wage moder-
ation that started in the late 1980s has been identi-
fied as one important explanatory factor for the ob-
served increase in the employment content of
growth, other factors seem to have contributed as
well, including a better management of benefit re-
gimes and more active labour market programmes.6
Convergence of employment in the EU15
but huge differences still remain:
Labour market performances have converged in the
period observed. Not only has the EU employment
rate increased relatively strongly but also differen-
ces between the EU15 countries have declined. Ta-
ble 1 below compares the relative situation of the
Member States as against the 70% target, with their
pace of progress during the period 1997Ð2003, also
including the new Member States that joined the
EU in 2004. This convergence also applies to unem-
ployment and long-term unemployment. Intuitively,
one would expect the fall in long-term unemploy-
ment to be a result of a policy change, particularly
as the EES focused so strongly on the prevention
of long-term unemployment. Indeed, countries with
very high levels of long-term unemployment saw
strong decreases, most notably in Spain but also in
Belgium and Italy.
It is necessary to add that the less favourable devel-
opments in Germany also contributed to conver-
gence as Germany’s labour market indicators stood
above the EU average in the mid-1990s and have
improved very little since then, thereby contributing
to convergence. However, other countries, including
6 European Commission: Employment in Europe 2004 (chapter
2).
130 ZAF 1/2006
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, have
managed to improve their performance further. On
the other hand, France and Italy first looked like
laggards in the process but saw major improvements
in the later years of the period under observation.
The trend towards improved performance almost
everywhere seems to support the idea that the proc-
ess of peer pressure and mutual learning is proving
effective.
Having said this, one should not overlook that at the
same time the labour market indicators were still far
from the Lisbon targets. The speed of improvement
was too slow to bring the EU close to the targets
mainly because of the trends in some major coun-
tries including Germany, France and Italy. The Com-
mission’s report “Employment in Europe 2004” an-
alysed the labour supply trends over the medium-
term in the EU and especially in the major coun-
tries. This showed a change in the trend but one that
was insufficient to create enough supply potential to
allow employment growth to reach a 70% employ-
ment rate in 2010 for the working population as a
whole and even less so for the 50% target for the
55Ð64 age-group, a group more and more at the
centre of the concerns of policy makers confronted
almost on a daily basis with new projections of rising
old-age dependency.
Significance of new forms of contracts:
Several studies have related stronger employment
growth to a rise in fixed-term and, to a certain ex-
tent, in part-time contracts. These forms of employ-
ment seem to facilitate the hiring of workers as well
as the emergence of additional labour supply. While
most studies agree on this conclusion, others warn
that there is evidence in some countries of the possi-
bilities of temporary contracts being overexploitedGeorg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU
and signs that they are being used as substitutes for
permanent contracts.7 The risk of side-effects of an
increase in the use of temporary contracts is, how-
ever, only one of the less favourable messages re-
sulting from the above-mentioned studies. The more
fundamental question raised by some analysts is
whether the fact that employment growth needed to
be facilitated by the use of less well protected forms
of contracts is not itself a sign of remaining labour
market problems. This seems to be particularly rele-
vant in some Member States where policy debate on
labour market segmentation has sharpened.
Labour market segmentation and transi-
tions:
As part of the analysis of labour market perform-
ance, an important strand of the literature addressed
the issue of transitions, focusing on the longer-term
outcomes of people entering employment in jobs de-
pending on their characteristics with regard to con-
tractual forms, access to training and relative wages.
Studies8 showed huge differences between countries
in longer-term outcomes for people entering the la-
bour market under more restricted conditions. The
labour markets in some Member States seem to be
substantially more unequal in terms of opportunities
and access to more stable and better paid jobs. In
some countries, transitions from temporary con-
tracts to permanent employment are twice as likely
as in others, while the probability to remain active
in the labour market after some years in temporary
contracts also vary widely across countries.9 Over a
longer period, this will not only impact employment
and participation in numerical terms but it may alter
the skill-productivity profile of the labour force.
Slowdown in productivity growth:
Another less reassuring outcome of recent research
relates to productivity trends. Obviously, in statisti-
cal terms, if growth becomes more job-rich, produc-
tivity growth will decline. This decline has continued
since the mid-1990s and was seen less negatively
when the resilience of EU labour markets was
praised in the period of the prolonged slowdown be-
tween 2002 and 2004. Nevertheless, poor productiv-
ity trends seem to be an issue of concern especially if
compared with the rapid increases in the EU’s main
economic partners, such as the US and eastern Asia.
While a discussion of the reasons for the relative
7 See European Commission: Employment in Europe 2002 (chap-
ter 3) and Employment in Europe 2004 (chapter 4).
8 See subsequent issues of Employment in Europe for literature
surveys and analysis.
9 See European Commission: Employment in Europe 2003 (chap-
ter 4) and Employment in Europe 2004 (chapter 4).
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decline in productivity trends in the EU goes be-
yond the scope of this paper, there are some facts
worth mentioning when analysing job creation in re-
lation to productivity.
A higher job content of growth in an economy with
underutilisation of its labour resources implies first
of all that the labour market adjusts to the different
scarcity of inputs (see above). As productivity
growth associated with the increase in employment
was never negative, rising employment should have
a positive effect on economic growth and welfare.
In this sense, an increasing job content of growth
should be regarded as positive under the given cir-
cumstances of low employment rates and high un-
employment in many EU countries. Secondly, sec-
toral analysis10 showed that for major growth sec-
tors such as business services and finance, as well
as for high-tech services and industries, the EU has
managed to catch up with the US in terms of em-
ployment growth while the productivity gap has in-
creased. The question therefore arises as to whether
the obstacles to productivity growth are indeed re-
lated mainly to the labour market or to other mar-
kets or whether restrictions of demand are forcing
the economy to produce below capacity, which leads
to a situation in which better skilled people produce
below their productivity potential.
... and the nature of the new jobs created:
Increasing utilisation of labour resources could eas-
ily go hand in hand with lower productivity growth if
the additional labour resources are less productive,
assuming that the economy first employs the most
efficient resources. Therefore the strong increases in
employment rates in some EU countries may have
well been accompanied by the entry of less produc-
tive workers into employment and thereby by de-
clining productivity growth. This would certainly be
true if additional labour resources wished to work
fewer hours than the “main labour force” tradition-
ally employed, and there is evidence that this was
the case for the rising number of women, younger
and older people in employment. Indeed, the work-
ing-time effect explains part of the relative decline
in productivity growth compared with the US but
not the total.
On the other hand, there is little evidence in support
of the fact that the majority of additional workers
demonstrate lower productivity, especially in the
major countries where employment was and still is
10 See European Commission: Employment in Europe 2003
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low. In fact labour market entrants are typically
much better educated than those who leave the la-
bour market. Changes in the educational composi-
tion of the labour force are quite large if one com-
pares for example 1997 and 2002, particularly in
some countries with strong decreases in productivity
growth, such as Spain. Moving to the demand side
of the labour market, the composition of net job cre-
ation does not suggest that most net job creation
was of the low wage/low productivity type. More
than 60% of net job creation in the EU since 199711
has been in knowledge-intensive services, which rep-
resent one third of total employment. Similarly, net
job creation in high-tech industries and services sur-
passes by a large margin the share in either total
employment or GDP. These seemingly paradoxical
developments suggest that at least in some EU
countries, educated workers are not in a position to
fully use and develop their potential even if they are
not counted as being in low productivity employ-
ment.
4 Has enlargement changed the
European picture?
4.1 Labour market characteristics and
challenges of the enlarged EU
The prospect of enlargement with ten new Member
States had been anticipated and prepared for a num-
ber of years prior to 1st May 2004. It may, however,
still be too early to judge its real impact. What is
clear is that both the performances and the policies
of the EU have not remained untouched as a result.
The central and eastern European Member States
have undergone rapid restructuring of their econo-
mies and everything suggests that this process will
continue for years, leading to radical change also in
employment and labour market structures. In gen-
eral terms, the overall picture of the EU labour mar-
ket changes in statistical terms as a result of enlarge-
ment and becomes more diverse, as the employment
structure and employment-productivity patterns dif-
fer significantly between the former EU15 countries
and the central and eastern European Member
States.
The sheer fact of having 25 Member States affects
the EU average from a statistical point of view and
makes it relatively worse off in economic and em-
ployment terms (see table 2). The average employ-
ment rate of the EU25 was 62.9% in 2003, whereas
11 Ibid.
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it was 64.3% for the former EU15. In most new
Member States, with the exception of Hungary, em-
ployment rates have stagnated over the years, with
the employment rate in Poland actually decreasing
and becoming the lowest in the EU (51.2% in 2003).
The female employment rate of the new Member
States, which used to be higher than in the EU15,
has also declined over the years.
Although the issue was never addressed openly be-
fore enlargement took place, it was implicitly ac-
knowledged that the objectives and targets set for
the EU prior to enlargement would remain valid for
the enlarged Union. As a result, the gap that has to
be filled in order to meet the Lisbon employment
objectives and targets has increased somewhat.
Enlargement also increases the diversity of situa-
tions across the EU, at both national and regional
level. The new Member States are characterised by
relatively lower employment rates and higher unem-
ployment rates, with Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic as the poorest performers. Labour market partici-
pation and employment rates have declined, as peo-
ple leave the labour market and employment is de-
stroyed in traditional parts of the economy, such as
agriculture, without being fully compensated for by
job creation in services. Compared with the former
EU15, some new Member States, notably Poland
and the Baltic countries, show a substantially larger
proportion of employment in agriculture (12.4%
versus 4%), most of them have a larger share of
employment in industry (31.9% versus 27.6%) and
a markedly smaller share of employment in services
(55.6% versus 68.3%).12
Most interestingly, the pattern of economic and em-
ployment growth in the new Member States in re-
cent years also contrasts significantly with that of
the EU15. Following a period of strong job creation
in the late 1990s, the performance of the EU15 has
suffered as a result of the economic slowdown since
2001, and employment growth has stagnated. In con-
trast, the new Member States have achieved reason-
ably strong economic growth in recent years, driven
by strong productivity increases, while employment
has actually declined by 0.2%.
This pattern of productivity-driven “jobless” eco-
nomic growth may continue for some years in the
new Member States as a result of intense economic
restructuring. Table 3 presents a cross-tabulation be-
tween per capita income levels and their average
growth rates. The negative correlation between the
12 See European Commission: Employment in Europe 2004.Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU
(per person employed)
levels and growth rates of per capita income (ppp)
suggests a rapid catching-up of lower income coun-
tries.
In short, the new Member States display specific
employment challenges and priorities, although
their peculiarity may lie more in the magnitude of
the problems than in their nature. Given their spe-
cific labour market characteristics, one could see the
following policy issues emerging.
Firstly, these countries have had to undergo a mod-
ernisation of their labour market institutions and
employment legislation. For instance, these coun-
tries had comparatively low levels of active labour
market policies and weak unemployment benefit
systems to cushion the effect of restructuring and to
help people to remain active in the labour market.
Policies were extensively used to promote the with-
drawal from the labour market as a result. Employ-
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ment legislation was also characterised by strict em-
ployment rules by international standards, with pro-
tected employment in certain enterprises and sec-
tors and very little use of more flexible forms of em-
ployment such as part-time and fixed-term work.
This situation has changed rapidly over the years,
with important overhauls of employment legislation
in several Member States. The share of fixed-term
contracts has increased very significantly in several
countries: in Poland, it went up from about 5% in
1998 to 20% in 2003, raising new, unprecedented
questions about the risk of the labour market be-
coming segmented.
Secondly, the new Member States display compara-
tively favourable rates of completion of upper-sec-
ondary education, but relatively low levels of higher
education and continuous training. Given the rapid
changes in the economy and the resulting pressures
for job mobility, developing effective lifelong learn-The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU Georg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat
ing systems has been identified as a major challenge.
Difficult questions have to be addressed including
whether wages provide sufficient incentives for up-
skilling and how to provide tax breaks and other
financial incentives for individuals and enterprises
to invest in skills.
A third challenge concerns the extent of undeclared
work which, according to estimates, may concern up
to 20% of the workforce in some Member States.
This may be fuelled in part by the tax structure, with
a tax burden on labour that is too high and too con-
centrated. This is also partly a result of the restruc-
turing process, with informal work, for instance in
agriculture, playing a cushioning function for the
substantial numbers of low-skilled workers. Weak
administrative capacities and inadequate law en-
forcement may also explain why the phenomenon is
not being tackled adequately. The size of the in-
formal economy distorts business competition and
reduces the tax revenues necessary to finance public
investments and social protection schemes.
A fourth challenge concerns the integration of eth-
nic minorities into mainstream society and the econ-
omy. Some of the new Member States have large
shares of minorities from neighbouring countries or
endogenous to the countries, such as the Roma po-
pulation. Another related challenge is the need to
prepare for future migratory flows. As these coun-
tries have become the new external borders of the
European Union, they are likely to experience fu-
ture migratory pressures. Moreover, they are af-
fected by demographic decline, and are likely to ex-
perience significant emigration.
4.2 The new Member States and the
EES
In spite of the increased diversity of employment
situations and priorities brought about by enlarge-
ment, the integration of the new Member States in
the employment coordination process went rather
smoothly in political and institutional terms. Acces-
sion was preceded by a preparatory joint policy re-
view exercise between the (at the time) future Mem-
ber States and the Commission. In 1999 the Com-
mission initiated a co-operation process on employ-
ment with the future central, eastern and mediterra-
nean Member States. The future Member States and
the Commission produced together Joint Assess-
ments Papers (JAPs) on employment.
The JAPs13 reviewed the employment trends, the
characteristics of the labour market and the employ-
13 The first JAPs were signed with the Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Poland and Estonia in 2000 and early 2001, followed by Malta,
Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus and Lithuania in late 2001/early 2002
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ment policy challenges of the acceding countries.
The analysis of these papers was based on the as-
sumption of continued structural change resulting
from a further opening of the economies of the new
Member States and identified resulting policy chal-
lenges which national policies should anticipate.
These challenges were also considered to be rele-
vant for the preparations for the future use of the
European Social Fund as the main financial instru-
ment at EU level to support structural change.
The new Member States have been participating
fully in the EES since the date of their accession and
they produced their first National Action Plans for
Employment in November 2004. The content of the
employment guidelines in 2003, and again in 2005,
reflects the common view of what the employment
challenges and priorities are for the EU as a whole.
While the challenges identified in the JAPs and
NAPs of these countries are particularly pro-
nounced and somehow specific to each of the coun-
tries, they are by no means unknown to the EU15.
In fact, policy measures taken in the new Member
States (such as measures to address economic re-
structuring, undeclared work and regional dispari-
ties) have also influenced the former EU15, where a
number of Member States share similar challenges.
To some extent, the integration of the new Member
States has also rejuvenated the EES and highlighted
its added value. The quality and status of the first
NAPs produced by the new Member States were
praised by the Commission14, as they tended to be
both forward-looking and comprehensive docu-
ments. Enlargement has also led to a growing de-
mand for additional country expertise and renewed
cross-country comparison at EU level, which has
steered analytical work and mutual learning activi-
ties. Mutual learning may just be starting out in this
regard.
5 Assessing the impact and develop-
ment of the EES over time
The evaluation of the first set of guidelines
The policy orientation of the first set of guidelines
outlined above remained more or less valid for the
and by Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia in autumn 2002. The results
are summarised by the European Commission in its progress re-
ports COM(2003)37final and COM(2003)637 final.
14 European Commission: Draft Joint Employment Report 2004/
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first five years of the Strategy, although there was a
tendency to revise and add guidelines. The guide-
lines were extended to many related areas and be-
came more numerous themselves. After the first five
years, there was a general feeling that the policy
context should be reviewed and adapted to the
changing labour market challenges. An extensive
evaluation was carried out in 2002 which identified
major challenges and issues for the future of the
EES.
The Commission summarized the findings of the
evaluation in its communication on the first five
years of the EES.15 While remaining cautious as to
the exact impact of the EES on national performan-
ces, the communication highlighted a series of “sig-
nificant changes in national employment policies,
with signs of convergence towards the common EU
objectives”. In particular, the Commission high-
lighted reforms in public employment services and
in tax-benefit systems in line with the principles of
activation/prevention, progress in reducing the tax
burden on labour, attempts to modernise work or-
ganisation, particularly in terms of working time ar-
rangements and more flexible work contracts, and
a renewed endeavour to modernise education and
training systems, in line with the concept of lifelong
learning. The Commission also emphasised that
progress had been made in generalising the ap-
proach of gender mainstreaming, although gender
gaps remained wide.
Beyond policy convergence, the Commission consid-
ered that the Luxembourg process was particularly
instrumental in developing a new approach to policy
formulation away from managing unemployment
and towards promoting employment growth, as well
as new partnerships and working methods, both at
national and EU level, in particular in terms of mon-
itoring and evaluation.
On the other hand, the communication also identi-
fied a number of weak points and challenges for the
future, mostly related to the governance of the Strat-
egy and the need to move ahead with implementa-
tion. In particular, it acknowledged that the profile
of the EES remained far too limited in the Member
States. The evaluation also emphasised the need to
revamp the EES with a view to aligning it more
closely to the Lisbon goal of sustained economic
growth, more and better jobs and greater social co-
hesion by 2010.
15 European Commission: Taking stock of five years of the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy, COM(2002)416 of 17.7.2002.
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The revision of the guidelines and the report
of the Employment Taskforce in 2003
The integration of the EES into the Lisbon strategy
since 2000 and upcoming enlargement made a revi-
sion of the guidelines inevitable. Following the 2002
evaluation, the Commission and the Council worked
on new guidelines, which were eventually adopted
by the Council in March 2003. Following the integra-
tion into the Lisbon strategy, the 2003 guidelines
dropped the four-pillar concept and presented a list
of ten guidelines, including concrete input and out-
put targets, broadly in line with the original Strategy.
A new emphasis was given to issues such as human
capital, undeclared work and immigration. Greater
attention was also paid to improving the delivery
and governance of the EES in an enlarged EU,
through greater use of the country-specific recom-
mendations and a better linkage between EU spend-
ing and employment priorities.
Despite the results from the evaluation and the
adoption of a new set of employment guidelines, the
political perception prevailing at the time was that
nothing had actually changed in terms of employ-
ment performance and policy progress, and that ac-
tion was urgently needed in the face of economic
slowdown and stagnating employment. At the
Spring European Council in March 2003, EU lead-
ers asked the Commission to establish an Employ-
ment Taskforce headed by Wim Kok, the former
Prime Minister of the Netherlands, to further reflect
on priorities for action. The Taskforce submitted its
report16 in November 2003, which for the first time
also reviewed the situation of the new Member
States alongside the old ones.
The Taskforce put the emphasis on a number of new,
emerging policy themes:
Ð developing “job-to-job” insurance by stepping up
active labour market policies and supporting
transitions in the labour market, especially in the
situation of economic downturn;
Ð promoting flexibility combined with security;
Ð addressing the segmentation of the labour mar-
ket;
Ð investing in human capital and making lifelong
learning a reality.
The Taskforce also picked up the concerns regarding
the employment of older people and insisted on ac-
tive ageing as a means of increasing labour supply.
16 Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok:
Jobs, Jobs, Jobs Ð creating more employment in Europe, Novem-
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Labour supply was overall a central preoccupation
of the Taskforce which was the first EU exercise to
pay extensive attention to the predicted long-term
decline in the working-age population. The Taskfor-
ce’s report strikes an interesting balance between
the contribution to raising labour supply by means
of a better utilisation of the domestic labour poten-
tial and by means of economic migration, as well as
between measures to raise employment and those
to raise productivity growth, through expansion and
better use of innovation and modern work organisa-
tion. Despite the emphasis on labour supply, the
Taskforce report pays less attention to promoting
equal opportunities in the EU labour markets, espe-
cially to mainstreaming the gender perspective in
employment policies.
On governance aspects, the Taskforce confirmed the
main orientations of the EES, calling for a greater
use of the country-specific employment recommen-
dations, a better linkage between EU spending and
EU employment priorities, a more direct involve-
ment of the social partners in the Strategy and
greater efforts to share experiences and reinforce
mutual learning at EU level.
The report immediately inspired the Commission
and the Member States to adopt a new set of coun-
try-specific recommendations in 200417 and to
launch a new mutual learning programme at EU
level. The report also played a role in the discussion
on the future use of the Structural Funds, particu-
larly the European Social Fund.
The work of the Taskforce was apparently consid-
ered to be such a success that the European Council
asked Mr. Kok to chair a further High-Level Group
to prepare the mid-term review of the Lisbon
Agenda. This report, together with the Commis-
sion’s Communication of February 200518, laid the
ground for the revision of the Lisbon Strategy ap-
proved in March 2005 and the adoption of new inte-
grated guidelines for growth and jobs.
6 The relaunch of the Lisbon
Agenda: a new venture for the
EES?
The role of the EES as part of the Lisbon
Agenda
At the same time as the EES was developing, the
EU engaged itself in 2000 in a wider strategy of eco-
17 Council Recommendation on the implementation of Member
States’ employment policies (2004/741/EC) of 14 October 2004.
18 European Commission: Working together for growth and
jobs Ð a new start for the Lisbon Strategy COM(2005)24 of
2.2.2005.
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nomic, employment and social modernisation,
known as the Lisbon Agenda. This covered many
lines of action, ranging from the completion of the
internal market to the promotion of innovation and
R&D. Alongside economic and social reforms, em-
ployment was presented as one of the three dimen-
sions of the Strategy, with a return to full employ-
ment as the central objective. Both the relative suc-
cess and the remaining huge employment gaps in
Europe and between the EU and the US clearly
constituted two of the driving forces behind the
adoption of the agenda.
It is to be noted that the EES actually preceded the
Lisbon Strategy and, to a large extent, it was used
as a source of inspiration for the extension of the
open method of coordination to other policy fields,
such as social inclusion and social protection. As of
2000, the EES was designed as the leading policy
instrument to give direction to and ensure coordina-
tion of the employment policy priorities to which
Member States subscribed at EU level as part of the
overall Lisbon Strategy.
The issue of complementarities and synergies be-
tween the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
(BEPGs) and the EES, however, was soon to be
raised. Both coordination processes find their legiti-
macy in the Treaty (under articles 99 and 128 respec-
tively) and have tended to develop over the years,
with possible overlaps and/or inconsistencies in
terms of content and reporting. This concern was
echoed by the Barcelona Council of March 2002,
which called on the Commission to work towards
the “streamlining” of the processes. The Commis-
sion issued a communication later the same year,
trying to address procedural concerns.
Mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy
It is probably correct to say that, at the time of the
review of the Lisbon Agenda in 2004/2005, the feel-
ing in Europe about progress on growth and em-
ployment was somewhat mixed. While in the previ-
ous period of economic growth, employment rates
had increased comparatively strongly and unem-
ployment levels had come down, progress stopped
in 2001/2002 as economic growth became sluggish.
Unemployment increased during 2002Ð2004, al-
though this was much less marked than in previous
slowdowns, reaching high levels in certain Member
States. Long-term unemployment started to increase
again, after years of decline.
At the same time, the quality of work of those em-
ployed seemed to stay below its potential and there
were abundant signs that Europe seemed to be onGeorg Fischer and Luc Tholoniat The European Employment Strategy in an enlarged EU
a low productivity growth trend. Cyclical develop-
ments, such as the sluggish economic growth result-
ing from low domestic demand and the global eco-
nomic imbalances, played an important role in the
discussion on the mid-term review of the Strategy.
At the same time, it was clear that cyclical improve-
ments would not suffice for Europe to improve its
underlying economic potential, even more so in the
light of demographic ageing. Hence the need for fur-
ther structural reforms, not just in the labour mar-
ket, but also in the services, product and financial
markets.
Integrated guidelines for growth and jobs
and national reform programmes
Following the report from the High-Level Group in
November 2004, the Commission presented its ana-
lysis and proposals for the review of the Lisbon
Agenda in February 2005. This was later discussed
and endorsed by Heads of State and Government at
their Spring European Council in late March. This
coincided with a substantial revision of the Stability
and Growth Pact.
As the 2005 Spring European Council put it: “Five
years after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the
results are mixed. Alongside undeniable progress,
there are shortcomings and obvious delays (...). Ur-
gent action is therefore called for. To this end, it is
essential to relaunch the Lisbon Strategy without
delay and re-focus priorities on growth and employ-
ment. Europe must renew the basis of its competi-
tiveness, increase its growth potential and its pro-
ductivity and strengthen social cohesion, placing the
main emphasis on knowledge, innovation and the
optimisation of human capital”.
The main shift brought about by the review of the
Agenda may not predominantly be in the reforms
advocated, but relate more to the governance of the
process itself. While focusing more strongly on
growth and jobs, the Council also wishes to improve
the sense of ownership of the Strategy at EU and
national level through a new reporting system based
on a single annual national reform programme sub-
mitted by Member States, with a three-year time ho-
rizon (2005Ð2008). At the same time, EU institu-
tions would commit themselves to carrying out ac-
tions pertaining to their areas of competences, for
instance those related to the single market, in the
form of a Community Lisbon programme.
The direct implication of the review is to give a
stronger role to the two Treaty-based coordination
instruments, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
and the Employment Guidelines, which would from
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now on be combined into an integrated set of guide-
lines for growth and jobs. Following proposals from
the Commission, these guidelines were approved by
the Council and endorsed by the European Council
in June 2005.19 They will serve as a basis for Member
States to develop their national reform programmes
for the years to come, starting in autumn 2005.20 It
remains to be seen whether the changes initiated
early in 2005 will result in a reinforced Strategy,
building on the dynamics of the various EU coordi-
nation processes gradually developed over the years,
or whether it marks a radically new departure, with
adjusted ambitions, for the Union as a whole. The
Commission provided its assessment of the first na-
tional reform programmes in its 2006 annual
progress report.21
7 Final thoughts on the EES in
retrospect
What lessons could be drawn from the experience
of the EES? Is there something to learn for the fu-
ture of the Lisbon Strategy? Many scholars and re-
searchers have studied the EES from a political sci-
ence perspective. They often see the EES as a new
mode of governance, illustrative of the open method
of coordination which has blossomed in several EU
policy domains and is now at the core of the revised
Lisbon Agenda. They have investigated the role and
power of the various actors involved at European
and national level. While the emergence of an EU
strategy for employment is widely regarded as a ma-
jor novelty, discussion on its added value, signifi-
cance and impact continues. Four lessons on the
EES could be put forward for further reflection in
the context of this article.
The first lesson is that the EES is actually a moving
frame: much has happened to the Strategy over the
last eight years. Since its launch in 1997, the EES
has experienced many reviews and reforms. This has
even accelerated since 2002. This feature certainly
has a lot to do with the intrinsic tension of the EES,
which needs to accommodate political pro-activism
while securing its role as an administrative and insti-
tutional tool. On the one hand, there is indeed a
need or a wish to build up a political momentum for
employment at the highest EU level, for instance on
19 See Council decision of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the em-
ployment policies of the Member States.
20 See European Commission Staff Working Paper: Working to-
gether for growth and jobs Ð next steps in the implementation of
the Lisbon Strategy. SEC(2005)622/2 of 39.4.2005.
21 European Commission: Annual Progress Report on Growth
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the occasion of a new Presidency or for a Spring
Summit. Hence the tendency to renew the political
agenda constantly. On the other hand, there is the
more down-to-earth institutional and administrative
reality of the EES, sometimes characterised as a
routine, which, like employment trends, functions on
a different time horizon and requires time to be
built up and to develop. It also requires administra-
tive and institutional actors to support it, with an
important role being played by the Employment
Committee.
Ironically, while it is meant to achieve the opposite,
this combination of political activism and adminis-
trative routine may be detrimental to the credibility
and transparency of the process. There is indeed the
risk of combining the worst of both worlds, with po-
litical pro-activism leading to changing priorities and
endless multiplication of initiatives, while institu-
tionalisation would turn into some form of bureau-
cratised process run by an administrative elite. This
certainly would not make it easier for the actors
most concerned at EU, national and regional level
to own and publicise the Strategy. Therefore, un-
changed policy prescriptions for a certain period
have the potential to stabilise the policy process and
render it more effective if it maintains the dynamism
and avoids the bureaucratisation trap.
The second lesson, if one looks beyond the tip of
the iceberg, is that the scope and content of the EES
have grown and deepened over time, partly as a re-
sult of a learning process. The establishment of a
common language was a necessary first step in the
early years of the Strategy, which went hand-in-hand
with the development of common indicators at EU
level. Without such statistical and conceptual infra-
structures in place, the Strategy would not have de-
veloped. The second step was to use this common
grid to establish a shared diagnosis of employment
challenges and priorities at EU and national level.
It is only on this basis that common objectives and
targets could be developed, and that cross-country
assessment and exchange of experiences could ma-
terialise. This highlights the fact that the EES has
been an incremental process, gradually building up
its own dynamics over time.
The EES now covers 25 Member States instead of
15. It encompasses subjects which were not promi-
nent at EU level earlier on (such as wages, quality
and productivity of work, childcare, immigration,
undeclared work) and which reflect the full scope of
employment policies, not just labour market reforms
in the narrow sense. The EES has also led to the
development of new techniques and activities at EU
level, such as the mainstreaming of employment
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concerns in other policy fields and the development
of peer reviews to support mutual learning. At the
same time, the EES has been a catalyst to develop
and deepen employment analysis at EU level, both
in terms of the evaluation of performances (through
the Employment in Europe reports) and in terms of
the monitoring of policy performances (through the
Joint Employment Reports). In this respect, the ex-
istence and deepening of the EES has contributed
to bridging the gap between research and policy-
making at EU level.
There may, however, be a price to pay for such “suc-
cess”: while the Strategy has been able to produce
more sophisticated information and more articulate
policy messages about employment over time, there
has always been a more or less explicit call to sim-
plify ideas, policy messages and procedures, so as to
focus attention and trigger policy momentum at EU
level. This call for a greater political, less bureau-
cratic, profile is also to be seen in close conjunction
with the wish to communicate and raise awareness
about the EES and the Lisbon Strategy in general.22
The third lesson is that, although the EES remains
fragile, it can now be seen as a credible vehicle for
dealing with employment at EU level. The EES pro-
vides a legitimate and reasonably transparent policy
framework. It complements other policy instru-
ments in the employment field: legislation, social
dialogue and the European Social Fund. While ini-
tially influenced by the OECD, it now interacts with
the work of this organisation and the on-going re-
view of its Jobs Strategy.
The paradox is that while the vehicle seemed up and
running after a few years, there may have been some
reluctance to use it or fatigue in using it. This may
partly be a matter of resources invested in the Strat-
egy at national level, as the ability to follow and
benefit fully from EU activities certainly varies from
one Member State to another. It may also partly be
deliberate. The EES is a strategy developed by the
Member States collectively, with noticeable impact
on domestic policies and debates. From a Member
State perspective, there is always a risk that the end
result of a collective discussion (as in the case of
country-specific recommendations) will not serve its
specific interests. Although they are the key to the
success of the Strategy, transparency and peer pres-
sure can bring about “undesirable” spill-over effects.
22 For an assessment of the perception of EU policies in public
opinion, see in particular the European Commission’s special Eu-
robarometer 202 / wave 60.2 of March 2004 on the EU communi-
cation on employment and social policies and special Eurobarom-
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Nevertheless, the active participation of the new
Member States in the Strategy when joining the
Union can be seen as a sign that this risk does not
necessarily outweigh the potential benefit in terms
of support in the domestic policy debate. Since the
Lisbon European Council of 2000 and the revision
of 2005, the EES is now well established as the “em-
ployment pillar” of the Lisbon Strategy. The success
of one will depend on the success of the other.
The fourth and final lesson is that the analysis of
the EES as an institutional phenomenon cannot be
disentangled from its political and economic con-
text. The EES is a political object, built on an under-
standing of what the EU economic, employment and
social challenges and priorities are. By definition,
the EES must accommodate the cultural, political
and socio-economic differences which exist across
the EU: it is therefore partly a diplomatic exercise
to combine these differences into a single frame-
work, as well as to review this process over time
to capture new political, economic and employment
trends. Such reviews are all the more hazardous as
the EES, like most EU processes in the employment
and social areas, is fairly new at EU level. Despite
some recognition in the Treaty, the detailed content
and mechanisms of these processes are not cast in
stone and are still under development. While the
EES may have developed a coherence of its own,
with a (sufficient?) number of political entrepre-
neurs behind it, circumstances matter and break-
throughs and policy shifts are always possible.
8 Conclusions
The establishment of the European Employment
Strategy represents a significant institutional and
political development at EU level. Its content and
mechanisms are deeply rooted in the economic and
policy context of the 1990s and have been reviewed
and adapted over time.
While the EU-wide emphasis on employment has
had some tangible effects on policies and perform-
ances, in particular in terms of a return to employ-
ment growth and an increase in employment rates,
many major challenges remain or have developed
since the mid-1990s, showing that there is ample
room for a European strategy in support of growth
and jobs. With deepening political, economic and so-
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